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Cognitive dissonance is the stress that comes from holding two conflicting thoughts simultaneously
in the mind, usually arising when people are asked to choose between two detrimental or two
beneficial options. In view of the well-established role of emotions in decision making, here we
investigate whether the conventional structural models used to represent the relationships among
basic emotions, such as the Circumplex model of affect, can describe the emotions of cognitive
dissonance as well. We presented a questionnaire to 34 anonymous participants, where each question
described a decision to be made among two conflicting motivations and asked the participants to
rate analogically the pleasantness and the intensity of the experienced emotion. We found that the
results were compatible with the predictions of the Circumplex model for basic emotions.
PACS numbers:
I. INTRODUCTION
The notion of cognitive dissonance as the unpleasant
motivational state that results from the inconsistency be-
tween people’s behaviors and cognitions was put forward
by the Stanford psychologist Leon Festinger about five
decades ago [12]. As first noted by Festinger, to reduce
this dissonance people seek to rationalize their behav-
iors by overvaluing their choices and undervaluing the
rejected alternatives.
The recognition that cognitive dissonance plays a key
role in people’s behavior when choosing between alterna-
tives led to the introduction of the so-called free-choice
paradigm [5]: since the selected alternative is unlikely to
be perfect, and the rejected one is likely to have some de-
sirable properties, making an irreversible choice between
them leads to the feeling of discomfort associated to cog-
nitive dissonance. Interestingly, the literature on the
free-choice problem has focused exclusively on the post-
decision changes in the assessment of the values of the al-
ternatives, i.e., overvaluing our choices [5, 11, 13, 15, 34],
a finding that is closely related to the basic human bias
of overestimating what we own, the so-called endowment
effect [18].
In this contribution we begin the exploration of a
different research vein, namely, the characterization of
the emotions people feel at the very moment they are
prompted to make a decision or to choose between two
qualitatively different alternatives – these are the emo-
tions of cognitive dissonances. Of course, the quantita-
tive characterization of emotions – whether associated to
cognitive dissonances or not – is itself a major research
problem to which there is no consensual solution at the
moment [32]. Here we follow Russell’s suggestion that
whenever a measure of emotion is needed one should use
scales of pleasure-displeasure and arousal-sleepiness [31].
Accordingly, we have presented a questionnaire contain-
ing 10 choice-questions to 34 participants and asked them
to rate the intensity and the hedonicity (pleasantness) of
the emotions elicited by those choices. In a second part
of the experiment, we ask the participants to write a sin-
gle emotion word that best describes the nature of the
experienced emotion.
The main drawback of our experimental procedure is
that by registering the degrees of arousal and pleasant-
ness only, we discard a priori other dimensions that
may also be important to characterize the emotions of
cognitive dissonance. Nevertheless, even within this lim-
ited scenario we can test whether those emotions can be
described by the Circumplex model of affect, in which
emotions are arranged in a circular form with two bipo-
lar dimensions interpreted as the degree of pleasure and
the degree of arousal [7, 30]. In that sense, emotions
mix together in a continuous manner like hues around
the color circle [31]. A reorientation and, consequently,
reinterpretation of the axes of the Circumplex model as
positive affect and negative affect has been suggested to
correct for the fact that there were few emotions in the
neutral middle region of the pleasantness-unpleasantness
axis [37].
We found that the measures of arousal E and pleas-
antness H obtained from the questionnaires are not in-
dependent quantities, contrary to the prediction of the
Circumplex model. Most remarkably, however, we found
that the axes determined by the directions of the first
and second principal components of the matrix of data
were in fact associated to actual dimensions of pleasant-
ness and arousal according to the emotion words used by
2the participants. In addition, the central region of the
(E,H) plane where the Circumplex model predicts emo-
tions should be absent is fittingly described by the word
indecision by the majority of the participants. Hence
in the context of the experiment reported here we con-
clude that our characterization of the emotions of cogni-
tive dissonance is consistent with the predictions of the
Circumplex model.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sect.
II we describe the procedure used to apply the ques-
tionnaires with the choice questions to the participants.
The items of the questionnaires are presented in the Ap-
pendix. In Sect. III we present a statistical study of the
answers to the choice questions, emphasizing the differ-
ences due to the gender of the participants. The corre-
spondence between emotion words and the regions in the
(E,H) plane is obtained using a clustering algorithm and
the suitability of the Circumplex model to represent our
data is discussed in that section too. Finally, Sect. IV
summarizes our main conclusions. An abridged version
of the present paper was published in Fontanari et al.
[14].
II. METHOD
As is previous studies [1–3, 6, 8, 9, 24, 28, 29], mental
experience was explored in interviews where participants
answered printed questionnaires (see also [4, 26, 27]).
Thirty-four anonymous participants (who were referred
to by numbers only), 17 men (age 49 ± 17 yr.) and 17
women (age 50 ± 17 yr.) were presented two question-
naires each containing ten items. Both questionnaires
presented the same items, but the participant was asked
to rate experienced pleasantness or hedonicity (H) from
one and intensity (E) from the other. All items described
a decision to be made among two conflicting motivations
and the participant was to rate analogically the magni-
tude of her/his experience.
Questionnaire E explored emotion: a horizontal line
was present below the item with a zero mark on its left
end. The participant was to pencil a small vertical mark
at that line rating the intensity of the experienced feel-
ing. The distance from the zero mark would indicate the
magnitude of the experience, denoted by E. After rating
the magnitude of the emotion, the participant wrote one
word describing the nature of the experienced emotion,
e.g., curiosity, surprise, joy, indifference, anger, etc.. We
were able to obtain the emotion words from 33 of the 34
participants.
Questionnaire H explored hedonicity: as before, a hor-
izontal line was present below the item but with a zero
on its middle, a minus (-) sign at the left end and a plus
(+) sign at the right end. The participant was to pen-
cil a small vertical mark on the right side of that line
if the feeling was pleasant, or on the left side if unpleas-
ant. The distance from the middle (zero mark) of the line
would indicate the magnitude of the experienced hedonic
feeling, denoted by H .
Thus, the hedonic and magnitude feelings were mea-
sured quantitatively in millimeters, as well as recorded
semantically. In order to minimize a possible influence
of answering one questionnaire on the response to the
other questionnaire, Questionnaires E and H were pre-
sented separately over time spans that varied from about
one hour to half a day, depending on the availability of
the participant; 17 of them received Questionnaire E first,
then Questionnaire H and the other 17 started with Ques-
tionnaire H. The first questionnaire was presented in the
morning period with the care to keep the gender of the
participants balanced, and the second questionnaire was
presented in the afternoon.
The ten items describing decisions to be made covered
a broad range of motivations, from minor decisions in the
daily life (e.g., how about movie or theater for tonight?)
to clear but non-vital problems (e.g., would you go for
a high-gain but risky investment or for a low-gain but
secure one?) and finally to vital problems (e.g., would
you go for radical surgery or for life-long therapy to treat
a severe illness?). The ten items are presented in the
appendix.
III. RESULTS
Our analysis of the answers to the questionnaire items
is greatly facilitated by the fact that they can be repre-
sented in a two dimensional arousal-pleasantness (E,H)
graph. So we begin our study by presenting a scatter plot
showing the raw data (Sect. III A) and then proceed to a
more detailed account of the gender-dependent distribu-
tion of answers for each choice question (Sect. III B). The
assignment of emotion names to each item of the ques-
tionnaire allows us to use those names to tag points in
the (E,H) plane and then define the distances between
emotion words as the Euclidean distance between points
in that plane. Given these distances we use a hierarchical
clustering algorithm to partition the emotion names into
8 categories (Sect. III C). A summary of the main results
is presented in Sect. III D.
A. Scatter plot
Our first task is to turn the analogical measures E
and H into dimensionless quantities. Recalling that the
degree of arousal E takes on positive values only and
the degree of pleasantness H takes on positive as well as
negative values, we can rescale these measures by their
maximum and minimum values so that E ∈ [0, 1] and
H ∈ [−0.5, 0.5], without loss of generality. In order to fa-
cilitate the visual inspection of the spread of these quan-
tities in a two dimensional graph, we have equated the
sizes of the domains of E and H .
In Fig. 1 we show that two-dimensional graph (scat-
ter plot) where the symbols indicate the values of the
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FIG. 1: Scatter plot of the degrees of arousal and pleasant-
ness. The crosses indicate the arousal-pleasantness coordi-
nates obtained from men’s rates and the open circles from
women’s. The horizontal straight line indicates the location
of the mean value H¯ = 0.029, whereas the vertical indicates
the location of E¯ = 0.417.
properly rescaled degrees of arousal E and pleasantness
H for the 340 points associated to the 10 choice ques-
tions of the 34 participants, as described in the previous
section. We have separated the answers – for simplic-
ity we will refer to a coordinate (E,H) as an answer
to a corresponding choice question – according to the
gender of the participants so that the crosses in Fig. 1
represent men’s answers and the circles, women’s. In
particular, the mean degrees of arousal and pleasantness
associated to men’s answers are E¯m = 0.380 (standard
deviation σEm = 0.257) and H¯m = 0.038 (standard devi-
ation σHm = 0.245), respectively, whereas for women’s we
find E¯f = 0.454 (standard deviation σ
E
f = 0.270) and
H¯f = 0.021 (standard deviation σ
H
f = 0.275). Regard-
less of gender, these statistical measures yield E¯ = 0.417
(standard deviation σE = 0.260) and H¯ = 0.029 (stan-
dard deviation σH = 0.260), which are also presented
in the scatter plot of Fig. 1. Interestingly, in the aver-
age, women exhibited a higher degree of arousal but a
lower degree of pleasantness than men. The histograms
exhibiting the distribution of E and H values were pre-
sented in Fontanari et al. [14]; here we just mention that
about 18% of the H values are very close to its mean
value so H¯ is actually the most likely value of H (vi-
sual inspection of the scatter plot confirms this claim),
whereas only about 5% of the values of E are very close
to its mean E¯.
B. Characterization of the choice questions answers
In order to better acquaint the readers with the partic-
ipants answers to the ten choice questions, we present in
Figs. 2 and 3 the degrees of arousal and pleasantness sep-
arated by gender for each question. In addition, Tables I
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FIG. 2: The degree of arousal E for each of the i = 1, . . . , 10
choice questions. The crosses are men’s answers and the open
circles, women’s. The filled circles indicate the mean degree
of pleasantness of each question regardless of gender.
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FIG. 3: The degree of pleasantness H for each of the i =
1, . . . , 10 choice questions. The crosses are men’s answers and
the open circles, women’s. The filled circles indicate the mean
degree of arousal of each question regardless of gender.
and II exhibit the mean values of those degrees; the stan-
dard deviations can be estimated by visual inspection of
the figures. To appreciate the underlying structure of the
participant answers we compare them with a null model
in which E and H are chosen randomly and uniformly
in the ranges [0, 1] and [−0.5, 0.5]. In this case the null
model mean degree of arousal associated to a given item
is a sum of 34 independent random variables uniformly
distributed in [0, 1] and so it has mean 0.5 and standard
deviation 1/
√
34× 12 ≈ 0.05. The same is true for the
null model mean degree of pleasantness except that its
mean is zero. Inspection of Tables I and II indicate that
for some items the range of variation of the participants’
answers is far greater than that predicted by the null
model.
A more useful piece of information is the correlation
4TABLE I: Mean degree of arousal for men (E¯m), women E¯f
and gender-independent (E¯) for the ten choice questions. The
last column shows a sample of the null model.
i E¯m E¯f E¯ null model
1 0.275 0.314 0.294 0.514
2 0.300 0.470 0.385 0.636
3 0.412 0.581 0.496 0.434
4 0.501 0.545 0.523 0.541
5 0.418 0.497 0.457 0.561
6 0.233 0.407 0.320 0.467
7 0.411 0.393 0.402 0.550
8 0.495 0.597 0.546 0.549
9 0.356 0.273 0.314 0.522
10 0.399 0.461 0.430 0.456
TABLE II: Mean degree of pleasantness for men (H¯m), women
H¯f and gender-independent (H¯) for the ten choice questions.
The last column shows a sample of the null model.
i H¯m H¯f H¯ null model
1 0.172 0.152 0.162 -0.009
2 0.129 0.107 0.118 -0.014
3 0.178 0.253 0.215 0.048
4 0.228 0.139 0.183 0.069
5 -0.077 -0.121 -0.099 0.034
6 0.076 0.158 0.117 0.072
7 -0.043 -0.197 -0.120 0.043
8 -0.191 -0.091 -0.141 0.019
9 -0.132 -0.086 -0.109 0.039
10 0.036 -0.108 -0.036 -0.042
between the degrees of arousal and pleasantness for each
question. This quantity can be calculated by introducing
the item-dependent covariances
Covi (E,H) = 〈EH〉i − 〈E〉i 〈H〉i (1)
with i = 1, . . . , 10 and is 〈X〉i =
∑
34
α=1X
α
i /34 is an item-
dependent expected value. Hence the measured correla-
tion coefficient for item i is
Cori (E,H) =
Covi (E,H)
[Covi (E,E)Covi (H,H)]
1/2
. (2)
Table III exhibits these correlations together with a
sample of correlations generated by the null model de-
scribed before. Of course, the choice questions have no
influence on the correlation values for the null model.
To facilitate the comparison with the null model we
consider the mean correlation regardless of the choice
question, which is obtained by adding up the correla-
tions in the second column of Table III and dividing the
result by the number of items. We find that the final
result Cor (E,H) = 0.203 is about four standard devia-
tions apart from the result predicted by the null model.
TABLE III: Correlation between the degrees of arousal and
pleasantness for each choice question. The third column is a
sample of the null model.
i Cori (E,H) null model
1 0.393 0.178
2 0.318 0.176
3 0.527 0.247
4 0.209 0.169
5 -0.157 -0.278
6 0.559 0.304
7 -0.003 -0. 013
8 0.112 -0.138
9 0.061 0.067
10 0.009 -0.001
More importantly, the finding that this correlation is sig-
nificantly different from zero shows that E and H are
not independent quantities as assumed in the Circum-
plex model of affection. In fact, we recall that Question-
naires E and H were applied in different periods of the
day exactly to minimize the influence of the answering
one questionnaire on the response to the other question-
naire. Hence the correlation reported here is not an ar-
tifact of the experimental setup. We will return to this
point in Sect. III D.
C. Emotion names
As pointed out in Sect. II, 33 participants described the
emotions they felt at making a choice by a single emotion
word. They used a total of 77 different emotion words
for the 330 choice questions. (See Table VI for a list of
all emotion words used by the participants.) In Table IV
we present the ten most frequently used emotion words
together with their frequencies. In addition, we note that
35 emotion words were used only once, and 13 were used
twice. In Fontanari et al. [14] we have lumped the 77
emotion words together into 18 classes according to our
common sense intuition of the proximity between those
words.
The first issue we need to address is whether the par-
ticipants used the 77 emotion words in a coherent way,
i.e., whether different participants used the same emotion
word to describe their emotions for the same choice ques-
tion. To quantify this expectation, we will calculate the
probability that two randomly selected participants de-
scribe their emotions by the same word for a same choice
question. The desired probability, which we denote by
P i, can be estimated by counting the number of pairs of
participants (there are 528 pairs in total) who choose the
same emotion word for each choice question i = 1, . . . , 10
and then dividing the result by 528. Table V shows these
probabilities for the 10 items together with a realization
of a hypothetical situation in which the participants pick
5TABLE IV: The ten more frequently used emotion names
together with their frequencies.
emotion name frequency
indifference 48
joy 25
interest 22
pleasure 16
hope 13
expectation 13
desire 11
anxiety 10
fear 10
surprise 9
TABLE V: Probability P i that one selects two participants
at random and they describe the emotions elicited by choice
question i by same emotion word. The third column is a
sample of the null model.
i P i null model
1 0.0757 0.0445
2 0.0738 0.0568
3 0.0530 0.0321
4 0.0890 0.0246
5 0.0284 0.0587
6 0.1193 0.0321
7 0.0625 0.0662
8 0.0719 0.0416
9 0.0511 0.0454
10 0.0435 0.0340
the 77 words with probability proportional to their fre-
quencies (see Table IV for the frequencies of the most
used words). The abnormally high value of P 6 is due to
the fact that 11 participants used the word indifference
to describe their feelings at choosing between a violin and
a piano sonata.
A better appreciation of the difference between the
data and the random null model is achieved by consider-
ing the probability that two participants selected at ran-
dom use the same word to describe the emotion evoked
by the same choice question, regardless of the question.
This probability is Pd =
∑
10
i=1 P
i/10 = 0.0668. For the
purpose of comparison, the same procedure applied to
the probabilities in the third column yields Pr = 0.0437.
The relevant question here is whether the value of Pd
could be replicated by some realization of the random
null model. To investigate this possibility we have gen-
erated 106 realizations such as that shown in the third
column of Table V so as to calculate the mean and the
standard deviation of the probability distribution of Pr.
The results are 〈Pr〉 = 0.0425 and σr = 0.0025. Hence Pd
is about 10 standard deviations away from 〈Pr〉, which
means we can safely discard the possibility that the as-
signment of the emotion words to the choice questions
were random.
The association of emotion words to items of the ques-
tionnaires offers us an opportunity to investigate the un-
derlying organization of the emotion name categories, a
line of research that has been extremely influential on
the quantitative characterization of emotions in the 1980s
[30, 31, 33, 37]. See, however, Russell & Feldman Bar-
rett [32] for a reappraisal of the conclusions drawn from
those studies. An important outcome of this research
avenue was the finding that emotion words are highly
interconnected and so saying that someone is anxious is
not independent of saying that person is happy or sad
[31]. A complementary approach to the structural mod-
els of emotion names categories, such as the Circumplex
model, is the exploration of the hierarchical structure of
those categories [33].
The central element in those studies of emotion names
categories is a distance matrix produced by asking in-
dividuals to rate the similarity between a given set of
distinct emotion words using a fixed discrete scale. See
Petrov et al. [25] for an alternative approach where the
distance is derived from the contexts in which the emo-
tion names are used in web retrieved texts. Here we take
advantage of our experimental setup described in Sect.
II to obtain an indirect measure of the distances between
the emotion names used to describe the participants’
feelings when answering the questionnaires items. More
specifically, for each emotion word we associate a unique
coordinate in the two dimensional space spanned by the
arousal and pleasantness dimensions. In the (typical)
case where there are K points
(
Ek, Hk
)
, k = 1, . . . ,K
associated to the same emotion word, we associate that
word to the mean coordinate
(∑K
k E
k/K,
∑K
k H
k/K
)
.
Hence the distance between any two emotion words be-
comes simply the Euclidean distance between points in a
plane.
The variance or spread of a set of points (i.e., the
sum of the squared distances from the center) is the key
element of many clustering algorithms [22]. In Ward’s
minimum variance method [36] we agglomerate two dis-
tinct clusters into a single cluster such that the within-
class variance of the partition thereby obtained is mini-
mal. Hence the method proceeds from an initial partition
where all objects (77 emotion names, in our case) are iso-
lated clusters and then begin merging the clusters so as
to minimize the variance criterion. Table VI shows the
resulting partition of the emotion names into 8 clusters.
We note that although these classifications are overall
reasonable there are a few dissonant groupings such as
the lumping together of the words interest and boredom
into category VI. However, as we will argue below the
appearance of antagonistic words in this particular cate-
gory is somewhat expected since it describes indecision.
As each emotion word in Table VI corresponds to a point
in the (E,H) plane, it is natural to think of the location
of the abstract categories in that plane as the position
6TABLE VI: The partition of the 77 emotion names into 8
clusters according to Wards minimum variance hierarchical
clustering algorithm.
category emotion names
I joy, pleasure, delight, satisfaction, enthusiasm,
excitement, elation, greed, waiting, relaxation,
relief, thinking, frustration, despair, challenge,
commitment, curiosity.
II uneasiness, puzzling, irritation, anxiety, distress,
sadness, indignation, hesitation, disgust, solidarity.
III fun, indifference, anticipation, rejection, comfort,
patience, nervousness, difficulty, disdain.
IV displeasure, purpose, wrath, fatalism, weariness,
stress, unbelief, discouragement.
V well-being, luck, desire, impatience, surprise, hope,
nostalgia, courage, expectation.
VI discomfort, embarrassment, guilt, anguish, interest,
incertitude, motivation, serenity, safety, concern,
fear, doh!, indecision, swindle, anger, contempt,
boredom.
VII disarray, furor, exasperation.
VIII uncertainty, disappointment, perplexity, repulsion.
TABLE VII: The center of mass of each emotion name cate-
gory in the arousal-pleasantness plane.
category E H
I 0.57 ± 0.08 0.27 ± 0.09
II 0.67 ± 0.09 −0.19± 0.05
III 0.10 ± 0.05 0.01± 0.1
IV 0.21 ± 0.06 −0.39± 0.08
V 0.39 ± 0.05 0.16 ± 0.03
VI 0.42 ± 0.09 −0.04± 0.07
VII 0.78 ± 0.05 −0.44± 0.03
VIII 0.50 ± 0.06 −0.35± 0.05
of the center of mass of the component words, which are
presented in Table VII.
D. Discussion
To conclude our analysis we partition the 340 points in
the scatter plot of Fig. 1 into 8 clusters using Ward’s min-
imum variance hierarchical clustering algorithm. Note
that, except for the emotion words used only once and
so represented by a single point in the scatter graph, this
partition is different from the clustering of the 77 words
into the 8 categories summarized in Table VI. The result-
ing partition together with the location of the emotion
name categories given in Table VII are exhibited in Fig.
4. That figure together with Table VI allow us to of-
-0.5
-0.3
-0.1
 0.1
 0.3
 0.5
 0  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.8  1
H
E
I
II
III
IV
V
VI
VII
VIII
FIG. 4: Partition of the 340 arousal-pleasantness coordinate
points into 8 clusters using Wards minimum variance hierar-
chical clustering algorithm. Points belonging to different clus-
ters are represented by a different symbols. The orthogonal
straight lines are the first and second principal components.
The Roman numerals indicate the location of the emotion
name categories described in Table VI.
fer an interpretation for the 8 emotion name categories,
namely, I (pleasure), II (uneasiness), III (indifference),
IV (displeasure), V (desire), VI (indecision), VII (furor),
and VIII (disappointment). Of course, although there is
a considerable degree of arbitrariness in the naming of
these categories we have chosen names that are represen-
tative of the majority of the member words of a category.
A few words are in order about Fig. 4 which summa-
rizes the main results of our analysis of the participants’
answers to the items of the questionnaires presented in
the Appendix. Category VI is located at the center of the
(E,H) plane and so correspond to answers which are in-
considerable from both the arousal and the pleasantness
dimensions. In addition, the list of emotion words used
to describe those answers comprehends pairs of antago-
nistic words such as discomfort and serenity, and interest
and boredom. Overall there is a well-balanced mixture of
positive and negative emotion words which cancel out
and in the average one get neutral words such as incerti-
tude and indecision which we think provide a very good
description for category VI: it is not associated to any
particular emotion name. This is a most interesting sit-
uation because one of the predictions of the Circumplex
model of affect is exactly an empty region in the center
of the (E,H) plane [30, 31]. Another interesting point,
is that classes I (pleasure) and IV (displeasure) are dia-
metrically opposed, though not along the H axis as one
would expect.
As pointed out in Sect. III B, our finding that the mea-
sures E andH are correlated, in spite of the experimental
effort to minimize their influences on each other, prompts
us to look for a set of uncorrelated variables to describe
the experimental points of the scatter plot shown in Fig.
1. This is easily achieved using principal component anal-
7ysis (PCA) and the results are exhibited by the orthogo-
nal straight lines in Fig. 4. The first principal component
has the slope 0.876 and the second has the slope −1.141,
so they are really orthogonal; they look distorted because
the figure is not a square. Most interestingly, the prin-
cipal component corresponds to the effective dimension
of pleasantness since categories I and IV are roughly lo-
cated at its opposite extremes. The interpretation of the
second principal component is more difficult. Categories
VII (furor) and II (uneasiness) fall very close to that axis
which seems to represent a decrease in arousal (furor is
more intense than uneasiness) but the lack of points in
the other extreme of this axis prevents a more assertive
interpretation.
In summary, given the PCA reorientation of the axis
and the interpretation of category VI as a ‘non-emotion’
class we found that our characterization of cognitive
dissonance emotions is consistent with the Circumplex
model of affect.
IV. CONCLUSION
Decision-making in situations of conflicting motiva-
tions (cognitive dissonance) is a source of emotion, usu-
ally described as a feeling of discomfort that results from
holding two conflicting thoughts simultaneously in the
mind. These decisions appear to be made in the hedonic
dimension of consciousness; the hedonic experience tak-
ing place as an actual or an expected reward. In this pa-
per we made a step toward exploring a new type of emo-
tions, aesthetic emotions related to knowledge or more
specifically, emotions of cognitive dissonance related to
contradictions between two pieces of knowledge. These
emotions could in principle be different from basic emo-
tions. Whereas specific words exist to name basic emo-
tions, there are no specific words for most emotions of
cognitive dissonance. This fact might be a reason that
these emotions have not been systematically studied in
the psychological literature.
Although the expression ‘cognitive dissonance’ has
been used for a long time [5, 12, 13], emotions of cognitive
dissonance have not been recognized as a special type of
emotions different in principle from basic emotions. By
presenting to participants questions as alternative mental
choices, our paper presents the first steps to address the
intricate issue of distinguishing experimentally between
aesthetic and basic emotions.
On the one hand, it can be argued that there is a funda-
mental theoretical difference between basic and aesthetic
emotions. Following Grossberg & Levine [16], basic emo-
tions can be considered as feelings and mental states re-
lated to neural signals, which indicate to various brain
regions satisfaction or dissatisfaction of fundamental or-
ganism needs. Mechanisms measuring these needs we
call instincts. Hence basic emotions are mostly related
to bodily needs, whereas aesthetic emotions are related
to the need for knowledge. In addition, Perlovsky [23]
argues that emotions of cognitive dissonance could be in
some way similar to musical emotions.
On the other hand, the experimental study reported
here failed to uncover any distinction between basic and
cognitive dissonance emotions; rather we found that the
latter can be described remarkably well by the Circum-
plex model, which is a structural model proposed to de-
scribe basic emotions [30, 31]. It might well be that our
experimental setup centered on the record of the degrees
of arousal E and pleasantness H elicited by the choice
questions is not sensitive enough for the fine distinc-
tions required to differentiate details of aesthetic emo-
tions. The measurement of other emotion dimensions in
addition to E and H may be necessary for achieving that
fine distinction, if indeed it exists.
To conclude, we note that understanding the underly-
ing psychological structure of emotions is germane for the
development of robotic systems capable of exhibiting as
well as recognizing emotion-like responses [10, 19, 21, 35].
In fact, according to our results and, more generally, in
conformity with the predictions of the Circumplex model
of affect [30, 31], the combination of two quantities –
the degree of arousal E and the degree of pleasantness
H – can explain a large part of the spectrum of human
emotional experience. Hence the design of artificial neu-
ral networks with sensors and estimators for these two
quantities may be an efficient manner to mimic human-
like emotion responses in machines. The neural network
models for decision making based on positive or negative
affect directed at objects or potential actions [17, 20] can
be viewed as examples of work in this research direction.
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Appendix
The 10 items of Questionnaire E aiming at measuring
the degree of arousal of the evoked emotion are presented
below. We note that the questions were formulated in
French (the participants were native French speakers),
so the following items are a nonliteral translation of the
original items.
1 Focus on what you feel when you are asked to make
the following choice: Do you prefer red or white
wine to accompany duck with orange? Do you feel
an emotion at the idea of this choice? Indicate its
intensity on the line below.
0 Max
82 Focus on what you feel when you are asked to make
the following choice: Do you prefer cinema or the-
ater? Do you feel an emotion at the idea of this
choice? Indicate its intensity on the line below.
0 Max
3 Focus on what you feel when you are asked to make
the following choice: Do you prefer the sea or the
mountain for the holiday season? Do you feel an
emotion at the idea of this choice? Indicate its
intensity on the line below.
0 Max
4 Focus on what you feel when you are asked to make
the following choice: Do you prefer to receive a
large amount of money in a single parcel or the
same amount in small parcels? Do you feel an emo-
tion at the idea of this choice? Indicate its intensity
on the line below.
0 Max
5 Focus on what you feel when you are asked to make
the following choice: Do you prefer a secure but
relatively poorly paid job or a very well-paid job
but at risk of loss of employment? Do you feel
an emotion at the idea of this choice? Indicate its
intensity on the line below.
0 Max
6 Focus on what you feel when you are asked to make
the following choice: Do you prefer to hear a violin
or a piano sonata? Do you feel an emotion at the
idea of this choice? Indicate its intensity on the line
below.
0 Max
7 Focus on what you feel when you are asked to make
the following choice: If your employer requires you
to learn a Scandinavian language, which one would
you prefer, Norwegian or Swedish? Do you feel an
emotion at the idea of this choice? Indicate its
intensity on the line below.
0 Max
8 Focus on what you feel when you are asked to make
the following choice: In order to treat a serious
illness would you opt for a quick surgery or for a
life-long therapy? Do you feel an emotion at the
idea of this choice? Indicate its intensity on the
line below.
0 Max
9 Focus on what you feel when you are asked to make
the following choice: Do you prefer a comprehen-
sive but very expensive insurance or a cheaper one
but with many gaps? Do you feel an emotion at
the idea of this choice? Indicate its intensity on
the line below.
0 Max
10 Focus on what you feel when you are asked to make
the following choice: Would you vote for a right
wing party, which guarantees citizen’s security, or
for a left wing party, which promotes an egalitarian
society? Do you feel an emotion at the idea of this
choice? Indicate its intensity on the line below.
0 Max
In order to measure the degree of pleasantness felt
by the participants in making those choices, they were
presented the same ten-questions questionnaire and after
reading each item they were asked to rate their pleasure
by penciling a small vertical mark on the straight line
- 0 +.
Here the - sign indicates a most unpleasant choice and
the + sign a most pleasant one, and the distance from
zero is the analog magnitude rating of hedonicity. This
set of questions comprises Questionnaire H as described
in Sect. II.
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